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INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the relationship between taxes and
intergenerational equity. Tax policy has traditionally been analyzed
using three metrics: equity, efficiency, and administrability.1 Equity
contemplates fairness and is generally viewed as having two
dimensions: vertical equity and horizontal equity.2 Under vertical
equity principles, differently situated taxpayers should be taxed
appropriately given their individual situation. Progressive tax rates, in
which higher income taxpayers are taxed at a higher rate than lower
income taxpayers, reflect vertical equity by recognizing the superior
“ability to pay” of higher income taxpayers.3 Despite a progressive tax
rate structure,4 income and wealth inequality have significantly
increased in the U.S. and other countries over the past thirty years.5
Future taxpayers may well be in a very different situation than current
taxpayers, both from increasing income and wealth inequality and
from the anticipated increasing burden of government deficits.
1. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-1009SP, UNDERSTANDING THE TAX
REFORM
DEBATE:
BACKGROUND,
CRITERIA,
&
QUESTIONS
4,
24
(2005),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/210/202725.pdf [https://perma.cc/4THE-K9TT]; see also JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, JCX-37-08, A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 1 (2008),
http://www.jct.gov/x-37-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/BD98-CVZC]; ASS’N OF INT’L CERTIFIED PROF’L
ACCOUNTANTS, GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF GOOD TAX POLICY: A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING TAX
PROPOSALS 3 (2017), https://www.aicpa.org/ADVOCACY/TAX/downloadabledocuments/tax-policyconcept-statement-no-1-global.pdf [https://perma.cc/99HJ-2NBT].
2. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-48-15, FAIRNESS AND TAX POLICY 4 (2015),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4737 [https://perma.cc/TEG3-VAJP].
3. Id. at 2.
4. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-6-01, OVERVIEW OF PRESENT LAW AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS RELATING TO MARGINAL TAX RATES AND THE PRESIDENT’S INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATE
PROPOSALS 44 (2001), http://www.jct.gov/x-6-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B85-49HX]. It should be noted
that the progressivity of the income tax has decreased markedly since 1979. See Michael Linden, The
Federal Tax Code and Income Inequality: How Federal Tax Policy Changes Have Affected and Will
Affect Income Inequality, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 19, 2012, 9:00 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2012/04/19/11404/the-federal-tax-code-andincome-inequality/ [https://perma.cc/23JD-XXT6] (“From 1979 to 2007 there were a number of major
tax changes, but the cumulative effect was to render the federal tax code less progressive and therefore
less able to dampen income inequality. By one measure of inequality, the federal tax code in 2007 was
about one-third less effective at reducing income inequality than it had been in 1979.”).
5. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME, 2014, at 3–4
(2018),
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/53597-distributionhousehold-income-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RM4-Z3CY].
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Moreover, government investments in education and infrastructure
have declined, which may impact the productivity of the future
economy and the future taxpayers’ ability to pay.6 Furthermore, the
current and past generations have prospered by free riding on the
environment, leading to the highest-measured carbon concentrations
in the atmosphere.7 Climate change threatens the existence of many
communities and may result in significant economic impact on future
generations.8
In an attempt to stem this rising tide of generational inequity, we
developed a concept of “sustainable intergenerational justice,” and we
use it as a lens for examining tax policy. Equity and justice are
interrelated. Both involve considerations of fairness. Resolving
inequity may require redistribution. To achieve consensus on
distributional goals, the distribution must seem just or equitable. In our
view, to attain sustainable intergenerational justice, the current
generation must ensure that future generations have adequate
resources to sustain life and prosperity. This Article shows how tax
system design could help achieve sustainable intergenerational justice.
To be clear, tax policy is only one tool for achieving intergenerational
justice, but we will show that it can be a powerful tool. In exploring
this topic, this Article uses the U.S. tax system for most of its
examples.
At the outset, Part I of the Article provides an overview of
sustainable intergenerational justice and tax policy. Part II then
provides an overview of the U.S. tax system, deficits, and public debt.
Part III then considers how taxes can influence the level of resources
that are available to future generations, and Part IV considers how
taxes can influence the mix of resources that are available to future
generations.
6. See MICHAEL LEACHMAN, KATHLEEN MASTERSON & ERIC FIGUEROA, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POLICY
PRIORITIES, A PUNISHING DECADE FOR SCHOOL FUNDING
1
(2017),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-29-17sfp.pdf [https://perma.cc/DP42-PAHD].
7. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., 2 U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE
ASSESSMENT
25
(rev.
ed.
2018),
https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_2018_FullReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LEA34BDU] [hereinafter NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT].

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss3/5

4

Forman and Mann: Borrowing from Millennials to Pay Boomers: Can Tax Policy Create

2020]

BORROWING FROM MILLENNIALS

803

I. Sustainable Intergenerational Justice and Tax Policy
A. What Is Sustainable Intergenerational Justice?
Intergenerational justice involves comparing the well-being of one
generation with that of other generations. In that regard,
intergenerational justice can be seen as the logical result of a Rawlsian
experiment in which the decisions about societal rules are based on the
choices made by individuals from an original position—one that lies
behind a veil of ignorance that includes generational blindness.9 For
example, as baby boomers, we might ask whether we are “better off”
than our parents.10 We have color TVs and personal computers, but
perhaps they had cleaner air and water.11 We may live longer, but their
lives may have been less hectic.12
If we ask whether our children will be “better off” than us, the
answer is not clear. On the one hand, technology continues to improve
lives.13 On the other hand, we cannot even say that our children will
live longer than we do.14 In the U.S., life expectancy has stagnated,
9. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118 (1971); Clark Wolf, Intergenerational Justice, in A
COMPANION TO APPLIED ETHICS 1, 279 (R.G. Frey & Christopher Heath Wellman eds., 2003).
10. Neil H. Buchanan, What Do We Owe Future Generations?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1237, 1258
(2009); Robert M. Solow, What Do We Owe to the Future?, 13 NEB. J. ECON. & BUS. 3, 6 (1974).
11. It is not clear whether air and water pollution was less of a problem in the 1950s and 1960s. See
generally RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962) (describing the hazards to human and animal health
posed by increasing use of chemical pesticides and herbicides). Although pesticides had been federally
regulated since 1910, the legislation was substantially revamped and strengthened in 1972. Federal
Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, § 2, 86 Stat. 973, 973; see LINDA-JO
SCHIEROW & ROBERT ESWORTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31921, PESTICIDE LAW: A SUMMARY OF
THE STATUTES 2–3 (2012), https://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RL31921.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FCN3-X7A2].
12. In 2000, the average worker spent 7% more time at work than the average worker in 1950. Ellen
R. McGrattan & Richard Rogerson, Changes in Hours Worked, 1950–2000, 28 FED. RES. BANK
MINNEAPOLIS Q. REV. 14, 16 (2004). Moreover, the percentage of dual-earner households increased from
less than half in the 1960s to two-thirds in 2010. Scott A. Hodge & Andrew Lundeen, America Has
Become a Nation of Dual Earner Couples, TAX FOUND. (Nov. 21, 2013),
https://taxfoundation.org/america-has-become-nation-dual-income-working-couples/
[https://perma.cc/UH6E-REZJ].
13. Mark Strauss, Four-in-Ten Americans Credit Technology for Improving Life Most in the Past 50
Years, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/10/12/four-in-tenamericans-credit-technology-with-improving-life-most-in-the-past-50-years/
[https://perma.cc/7LQFEGH8].
14. Jessica Y. Ho & Arun S. Hendi, Recent Trends in Life Expectancy Across High-Income Countries:
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even relative to other countries with developed economies like
Sweden.15
Creating a formal accounting model of intergenerational justice
would probably require us to take all of the resources that relate to
individual utility into account. Indeed, a thousand different valuations
might be needed to truly compare the utility of different generations.16
To be sure, it may be appropriate to try to make those thousand
different valuations. The focus of this Article is on tax policy,
however, and not on intergenerational justice per se. Accordingly, this
Article is less concerned with comparing the absolute utility of
different generations and more concerned with how taxes might affect
the relative positions of present and future generations. Pertinent here,
recent research links income inequality with declining life
expectancy.17 Other research links geography to social mobility.18 In
the U.S., the income inequality gap began to grow in the 1980s when
the authors were young adults.19
In any event, we believe that the problem of intergenerational justice
can be simplified. Certainly, most of us would agree that to attain
intergenerational justice, the current generation must ensure that future
Retrospective
Observational
Study,
362
BMJ
1,
8
(Aug.
15,
2018),
https://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/362/bmj.k2562.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/38EW-Q362].
15. Claudia Nau & Glenn Firebaugh, A New Method for Determining Why Length of Life Is More
Unequal in Some Populations than in Others, 49 DEMOGRAPHY 1207, 1208–10 (2012),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4104684/ [https://perma.cc/ZG9R-4NPD].
16. See Michael Doran, Intergenerational Equity in Fiscal Policy Reform, 61 TAX L. REV. 241,
263–65 (2008).
17. Eric Neumayer & Thomas Plümper, Inequalities of Income and Inequalities of Longevity: A
J.
PUB.
HEALTH
160,
164
(2016),
Cross-Country
Study,
106
AM.
https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2015.302849 [https://perma.cc/H594-TNFC].
18. See, e.g., Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman, Nathaniel Hendren, Maggie R. Jones & Sonya R. Porter,
The Opportunity Atlas: Mapping the Childhood Roots of Social Mobility 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
25147,
2020),
https://opportunityinsights.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/atlas_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NR5-X7X5]; Christopher Ingraham,
Downward Mobility: Where Middle-Class Kids Are Worse Off than Their Parents, WASH. POST (Oct. 2,
2018, 1:48 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/10/02/downward-mobility-wheremiddle-class-kids-are-worse-off-than-their-parents/?utm_term=.b1fff142c369 [https://perma.cc/6LQJKTUZ].
19. See, e.g., CHAD STONE, DANILO TRISI, ARLOC SHERMAN & JENNIFER BELTRÁN, CTR. ON BUDGET
& POLICY PRIORITIES, A GUIDE TO STATISTICS ON HISTORICAL TRENDS ON INCOME INEQUALITY 13
(2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-28-11pov_0.pdf https://perma.cc/7RWR67Q9].
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generations have adequate resources to sustain life and prosperity. This
Article goes further by assuming that, at a minimum, intergenerational
justice demands that future generations should be able to live at least
as well as we do, and in addition, we hope that the future will bring us
a more equal society. All in all, intergenerational justice means that the
current generation should not impose economic and resource burdens
on future generations.
We recognize that the world is already in an environmental and
economic crisis caused by the overuse of certain resources, but our
conception of intergenerational justice does not focus on preserving
particular resources; although, tax policy could have an impact on both
the use and preservation of resources.20 Intergenerational justice does
not demand that the current generation use less depletable resources
(like coal or oil) today so that future generations can have a “fair share”
of those resources tomorrow; nor does intergenerational justice require
that the current generation preserve the current sea level, particular
species of animals and plants, or even current air quality. Instead, our
concept of sustainable intergenerational justice requires that the
current generation use resources at the same rate that it replaces them
or develops economic substitutes for them, along the lines of the
so-called Lockean proviso of leaving “enough, and as good, left in
common for others.”21 Sustainable intergenerational justice also
encompasses the idea that the current generation should leave the Earth
in a survivable condition so that future generations can thrive.22
Current investment by today’s generations may be necessary to
achieve that result, for example, through investment in sustainable
energy and transportation systems.

20. See, e.g., Roberta F. Mann, Like Water for Energy: The Water-Energy Nexus Through the Lens of
Tax Policy, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 505, 508 (2011).
21. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 11 (Jonathan Bennett ed., 2017) (1690).
22. See generally, e.g., JOHN DERNBACH, ACTING AS IF TOMORROW MATTERS (2012).
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B. How Can Tax Policy Influence Sustainable Intergenerational
Justice?
Government choices about the level of taxation and spending will
clearly have an impact on the well-being of future generations.
Moreover, government choices about the mix of taxes that are used to
raise revenue will affect the resources available to future generations.
These propositions are outlined in this section and then further
explored in later parts of this Article. At the outset, however, this
section provides a brief overview of the resources of U.S. households.
1. The Resources of U.S. Households
In 2018, the median household income in the U.S. was $63,179,23
and the median per capita income was $36,080.24 In 2016, U.S. median
household net worth was $94,670.25 Unfortunately, however, the U.S.
does not rank very high on measures of intergenerational justice. For
example, according to a 2013 study of Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development countries, the U.S. was found to have
one of the largest ecological footprints, the highest level of child
poverty, a high level of public debt per child, and a fairly high level of
bias in favor of the elderly in social spending.26 The U.S. also received
low grades on infrastructure.27
23. JESSICA SEMEGA ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-266, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES:
2018,
at
1
(2019),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2019/demo/p60-266.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U67H-L25J].
24. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CPS POPULATION AND PER CAPITA MONEY INCOME, ALL RACES: 1967 TO
2018 tbl.P-1, https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/tables/time-series/historical-incomepeople/p01ar.xls [https://perma.cc/Z846-6TDB] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019).
25. JONATHAN EGGLESTON & ROBERT MUNK, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P70BR-166, NET WORTH OF
HOUSEHOLDS:
2016,
at
1,
2
tbl.2
(2019),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2019/demo/p70br-166.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6KV5-Q5X9]).
26. PIETER VANHUYSSE, BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE IN AGING
SOCIETIES: A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON OF 29 OECD COUNTRIES 10–28 (Daniel Schraad-Tischler
&
Najim
Azahaf
eds.,
2013),
https://www.bertelsmannstiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/GP_Intergenerational_justice_in_agin
g_societies.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5CK-RXRY]. See generally C. EUGENE STEUERLE, DEAD MEN
RULING: HOW TO RESTORE FISCAL FREEDOM AND RESCUE OUR FUTURE (2014).
27. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, 2017 INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD 2 (2018),
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2. Taxes Can Influence the Level of Resources that Are
Available to Future Generations
Governments use taxes to raise the revenue they need to pay for
government programs. Net government resources can be expressed by
the following equation:
G=R–S
where G represents government resources, R represents revenues, and
S represents spending.
When a government spends more on government programs than it
collects in revenue, it creates a deficit, which can be expressed by
flipping the previous equation:
G (Deficit) = S – R
The federal government funds deficit spending by borrowing.
Although deficit spending can be beneficial in times of recession by
creating a short-term economic stimulus, in times of robust economic
growth, deficit spending can crowd out private investment.28
Economic output can be described as the sum of private
consumption, private savings, and net government activity, as
expressed by the following equation:
Y=C+I+G+X
where C represents private consumption, I represents private
investment, G represents net government investment, and X represents
net exports. If net economic output, Y, remains constant, increases in
G must therefore reduce either private investment or net exports, or
https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/2017-Infrastructure-ReportCard.pdf [https://perma.cc/PE8G-9638].
28. See, e.g., GRANT A. DRIESSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44383, DEFICITS, DEBT, AND THE
ECONOMY:
AN
INTRODUCTION
7
(2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44383.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D53C-EPFU].
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some combination of the two, hence the anticipated crowding-out
effect.
Over time, deficits can lead to a large and growing public debt that
can have adverse consequences on the well-being of future
generations.29 Inevitably, deficits represent a transfer from later
generations to the current one, as money borrowed now will eventually
require repayment with interest. The Center for a Responsible Federal
Budget calls the national debt “fundamentally a generational issue.”30
A major concern is loss of “fiscal space,” which represents the
government’s ability to borrow to cushion a future recession.31
However, scholars differ on the significance of deficits. As described
by New York University law professor Daniel Shaviro, the
generational equity concern about budget deficits rests on the
following belief:
[D]eficit spending reduces the perceived (whether or not the
actual) cost of government spending to current consumers
and voters, thus inducing them to feel wealthier. They
therefore consume more, leave less for subsequent
generations, and accept a higher level of government
spending than they would have otherwise.32
Harvard economics professor N. Gregory Mankiw noted that although
temporary deficit spending may be justified in the case of an economic
recession, the current deficit trajectory is unsustainable.33

29. Id. at 6–10.
30. Why Should We Worry About the National Debt, COMMITTEE FOR RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET
(Apr.
16,
2019),
http://www.crfb.org/papers/why-should-we-worry-about-national-debt
[https://perma.cc/4CQZ-SF9X].
31. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, Fiscal Space and the Aftermath of Financial Crises: How
It Matters and Why, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1, 1 (2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/Fiscal-Space-and-the-Aftermath-of-Financial-Crises.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J3U4-TJUG].
32. DANIEL SHAVIRO, DO DEFICITS MATTER? 3 (1997).
33. N. Gregory Mankiw, The National Debt Is Still a Problem, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/business/national-debt-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/UDH6N4KR].
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Tax systems can also influence economic growth,34 and faster
growth can result in more economic resources for future generations.
Of course, some wonder whether economic growth will necessarily
lead to an enhanced quality of life, particularly in high-income
societies.35 However, regardless of views on the sustainability of
economic growth, taxes can influence individual decisions about
working, saving, and consumption,36 and each of these decisions can
influence the level of resources that are available to future generations.
3. Taxes Can Influence the Mix of Resources that Are Available
to Future Generations
Because tax systems can influence individual decisions about
working, saving, and consumption, tax systems can also influence the
mix of resources that are available to future generations. For example,
by encouraging education, tax systems can increase human capital and
thus promote economic growth.37 Also, by taxing negative
externalities like pollution, a tax system can save depletable resources
and preserve the environment for future generations.38

34. See, e.g., WILLIAM MCBRIDE, TAX FOUND., NO. 207, WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE ON TAXES AND
GROWTH? 1–2 (2012), https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/sr207.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4CX36BD].
35. Richard B. Howarth, Sustainability, Well-Being, and Economic Growth, MINDING NATURE, Sept.
2012, at 32, 33.
36. William G. Gale & Andrew A. Samwick, Effects of Income Tax Changes on Economic Growth,
in ALAN J. AUERBACH & KENT SMETTERS, THE ECONOMICS OF TAX POLICY 13, 31 (2017) (arguing that
tax increases stifle economic growth). For a contrary view, see Chad Stone, Economic Growth: Causes,
Benefits, and Current Limits, CTR. FOR BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Apr. 27, 2017),
https://www.cbpp.org/economy/economic-growth-causes-benefits-and-current-limits
[https://perma.cc/98QJ-XU2R] (testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Small
Business arguing that no relationship between economic growth and tax cuts has been shown).
37. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-47-15, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TAX POLICY 23−26
(2015),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=download&id=4736&chk=4736&no_html=1
[https://perma.cc/SZ24-TNA2]; Jonathan Temple, Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Growth
Effects of Education and Social Capital in the OECD Countries, at 5, OECD Doc. ECO/WKP(2000)36
(Oct. 12, 2000).
38. See infra Section IV.A. for an explanation of the term “externality.”
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II. An Overview of U.S. Taxes, Deficits, and Debt
A. Taxes
The U.S. federal government raises virtually all of its revenue from
individual income taxes, payroll taxes, corporate income taxes, estate
and gift taxes, and excise taxes on selected goods and services.39 State
and local governments raise most of their tax revenue from income
taxes, sales taxes, and property taxes.40 Taxes amount to about 30% of
the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP),41 and federal taxes are about
two-thirds of that.42 For example, in 2017, when the GDP of the U.S.
was around $19.4 trillion, the federal government collected around
$3.3 trillion in taxes, and state and local governments collected around
$1.6 trillion in taxes.43 More specifically, in fiscal year 2018, the U.S.
federal government collected $3.329 trillion in revenue, including
$1.684 trillion in individual income taxes (8.3% of GDP), $1.171
trillion in payroll taxes (5.8% of GDP), $205 billion in corporate
income taxes (1.0% of GDP), $95 billion in excise taxes (0.5% of
GDP), and $23 billion in estate taxes (0.1% of GDP).44 In fiscal year
2017, state and local governments collected more than $1.6 trillion in
taxes, including $574 billion in sales and gross receipts taxes, $526

39. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 627, 688 tbl.B-45, 690
tbl.B-47
(2019),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ERP-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FJS4-RCTP]; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-9-19, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX
SYSTEM
AS
IN
EFFECT
FOR
2019,
at
1
(2019),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=download&id=5172&chk=5172&no_html=1
[https://perma.cc/H4X8-WM33].
40. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 39, at 693 tbl.B-50.
41. See, e.g., BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, WHAT IS GDP? (2018),
https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/GDP-Education-by-BEA.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA5SL78Y].
42. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 39, at 634 tbl.B-2, 660 tbl.B-20; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
TABLE 1. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT AND BY STATE: 2017
(2017),
https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-finances/tables/2017/summarytables/17slsstab1a.xlsx?# [https://perma.cc/V9U6-6ZUG ] [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 1].
43. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 39, at 634 tbl.B-2, 660 tbl.B-20; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
TABLE 1, supra note 42.
44. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2019 TO 2029, at 1, 91 tbl.4-1
(2019), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files?file=2019-01/54918-Outlook.pdf [https://perma.cc/38VW92Y9].
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billion in property taxes, $384 billion in individual income taxes, and
$53 billion in corporate income taxes.45
1. Income Taxes
The largest of the U.S. federal taxes is the income tax imposed on
individuals.46 Taxpayers file returns as unmarried individuals, heads
of household, married couples filing joint returns, or married couples
filing separate returns.47 As a starting point, taxpayers first determine
the amount of their gross income.48 Gross income includes all income
from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the wages,
salary, tips, gains, dividends, interest, rents, and royalties received by
taxpayers during the taxable year.49 From gross income, taxpayers
subtract certain deductions to determine their adjusted gross income
and then taxable income.50 Most taxpayers simply claim a standard
deduction,51 but some taxpayers can claim certain itemized deductions
in lieu of the standard deduction.52 Also, certain other deductions are
allowed without regard to whether the taxpayer chooses to itemize.53
By historical standards, the present income tax rates are relatively low:
the top individual income tax rate is 37%, but most Americans face
marginal tax rates of 10%–22%.54 The amount that a taxpayer must
actually pay (or, alternatively, will receive as a refund) is equal to the
taxpayer’s income tax liability minus her allowable tax credits.55 Most

45. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 1, supra note 42.
46. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-9-19, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AS IN EFFECT
FOR 2019, at 2−11, 25 tbl.A-1, 26 tbl.A-2, 27 tbl.A-3 (2019).
47. See, e.g., Choosing the Correct Filing Status, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Jan. 15, 2020),
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/correct-filing-status [https://perma.cc/QW3G-TLQ4].
48. See 26 U.S.C. § 61 (2018).
49. Id.
50. Id. §§ 62–63.
51. Id. § 63(c).
52. Id. § 63(d).
53. Id. § 62.
54. 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2018); Historical Highest Marginal Tax Rates, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Jan. 18, 2019),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-highest-marginal-income-tax-rates
[https://perma.cc/BDB2-NQQY].
55. 26 U.S.C. § 1.
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states and many local governments also levy income taxes on
individuals.56
The U.S. federal government also imposes an income tax on
corporations.57 The taxable income of a corporation generally is made
up of gross income less allowable deductions.58 Allowable deductions
include ordinary and necessary business expenditures, such as salaries,
wages, interest expense, depreciation, certain losses, selling expenses,
and other expenses. The U.S. statutory corporate tax rate is 21%59
although effective corporate tax rates vary widely.60 Many states also
levy corporate income taxes.61
2. Payroll Taxes
Payroll taxes are used to finance Social Security, Medicare, and the
federal unemployment insurance program.62 Payroll taxes are levied
on earnings in employment and self-employment covered by Social
Security with portions of the total tax allocated by law to the Old-Age
and Survivors Insurance trust fund, the Disability Insurance trust fund,
and the Medicare Hospital Insurance trust fund.63 In 2020, employees
and employers each pay a payroll tax of 7.65% on the first $137,700
of wages and 1.45% on wages over that amount, and self-employed
individuals pay comparable amounts.64

56. Tax Policy Center Briefing Book: The State of State (and Local) Tax Policy, TAX POL’Y CTR.,
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-sources-revenue-state-governments
[https://perma.cc/4Q2W-DFRP] (last visited Apr. 17, 2020).
57. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-9-19, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AS IN EFFECT
FOR 2019, at 12–17 (2019).
58. 26 U.S.C. § 63(a).
59. 26 U.S.C. § 11 (2018).
60. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-520, CORPORATE INCOME TAX:
EFFECTIVE TAX RATES CAN DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE STATUTORY RATES (2013),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654957.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GRL-LACB].
61. TAX POL’Y CTR., supra note 56.
62. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-9-19, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AS IN EFFECT
FOR 2019, at 20−21.
63. Id.
64. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., FACT SHEET: 2020 SOCIAL SECURITY CHANGES (2020),
https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/factsheets/colafacts2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/3722-MEQW].
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Employers are also subject to a 6% unemployment insurance payroll
tax on the first $7,000 in wages paid to each covered employee.65
3. Consumption Taxes
The U.S. federal government also collects modest excise taxes on
various consumer products and services, including alcoholic
beverages, tobacco products, motor fuels, air transportation, and
telephone service.66 For example, the U.S. federal government collects
18.3 cents per gallon of gasoline and 24.3 cents per gallon of diesel
motor fuel.67 To be sure, motor fuel taxes do not go into the general
budget but rather are dedicated to the Highway Trust Fund, which
funds both federal and state road construction.68 Nonetheless, the fuel
taxes, which have not been increased since 1993, are insufficient for
the needs of U.S. road infrastructure, requiring additional transfers
from the general budget.69
4. Wealth and Property Taxes
Many state and local governments collect property taxes.70 The U.S.
federal government also imposes estate and gift taxes on lifetime
transfers and transfers at death made by wealthy Americans.71 Some
states also impose modest taxes on estates or inheritances.72

65. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-9-19, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AS IN EFFECT
FOR 2019, at 20.

66. Id. at 22−23.
67. Id. at 23 tbl.3.
68. ROBERT S. HIRK & WILLIAM J. MALLETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45350, FUNDING AND
FINANCING HIGHWAYS AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION 1 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45350.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5948-ZGR6].
69. Roberta F. Mann, Sustainably Funding Transportation Infrastructure: Tax Fuel or Miles?, 31
AUSTL. TAX F. 609, 617–18 (2016).
70. TAX POL’Y CTR., supra note 56.
71. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-9-19, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AS IN EFFECT
FOR 2019, at 18–19.
72. Morgan Scarboro, Does Your State Have an Estate or Inheritance Tax?, TAX FOUND. (Apr. 5,
2018), https://taxfoundation.org/state-estate-tax-inheritance-tax-2018/ [https://perma.cc/JSF4-XB65].
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Spending and Deficits

The U.S. federal government is not required to balance its operating
budget, and it rarely does.73 For example, in fiscal year 2018, when the
U.S. federal government raised $3.329 trillion in revenue (16.4% of
GDP), it spent $4.108 trillion (20.3% of GDP), creating a deficit of
$779 billion (3.8% of GDP).74 Moreover, the Congressional Budget
Office projects that annual deficits over the next ten years will average
4.4% of GDP.75
State and local governments generally are required to balance their
operating budgets.76 Accordingly, state and local governments
typically spend about what they raise. For example, in fiscal year 2017,
state and local governments actually spent just a little more than the
$3.4 trillion that they raised from all taxes and other revenue sources;
that year they spent almost $3.7 trillion, much of it on education
($1.012 trillion), public welfare ($673 billion), highways ($181
billion), and public safety ($115 billion).77

73. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:
2019 TO 2029, at 6 fig.1-1 (2019).
74. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2019 TO 2029, at 7 tbl.1-1.
75. Id.; see also The Decade in the Federal Budget, COMMITTEE FOR RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET:
BLOG (Dec. 30, 2019), http://www.crfb.org/blogs/decade-federal-budget [https://perma.cc/DS8P-3BPA]
(showing trillion-dollar-plus budget deficits in coming years).
76. See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE BALANCED
BUDGET
PROVISIONS
2
(2010),
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/StateBalancedBudgetProvisions2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W3W2-W4B6]; KIM S. RUEBEN & MEGAN RANDALL, URBAN INST., BALANCED
BUDGET
REQUIREMENTS:
HOW
STATES
LIMIT
DEFICIT
SPENDING
(2017),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/94891/balanced-budget-requirements_5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6G9F-C43C].
77. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 1, supra note 42.
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C. Debt
1. U.S. Federal Government Debt
a. Explicit Debt
Measuring the total debt of a government is always a little
challenging. One approach is to determine how much a government
has borrowed. For example, on December 26, 2019, the U.S. federal
government had a total public debt outstanding of $23.087 trillion (i.e.,
explicit debt).78 Another approach is to look at that portion of the
government’s indebtedness that is held by the public. For example, on
December 26, 2019, the U.S. federal government had a total debt held
by the public of $17.115 trillion.79 According to the Congressional
Budget Office, the debt held by the public was $15.751 trillion at the
end of fiscal year 2018, and it is projected to grow to $28.739 trillion
by fiscal year 2029.80 Over the long term, this public debt is projected
to grow from 78% of GDP in fiscal year 2019 to 144% in fiscal year
2049,81 and then to 530% of GDP in fiscal year 2093.82
b. Implicit Debt
In addition to its explicit public debt, the U.S. federal government
has a great deal of implicit debt, including unfunded liabilities for the
pension and other post-employment benefits (OPEBs) of government
employees, as well as its unfunded liabilities for programs such as
Social Security and Medicare. For example, as of January 1, 2019, the
78. The
Debt
to
the
Penny
and
Who
Holds
It,
TREASURY
DIRECT,
https://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/debt/current [https://perma.cc/8TE5-5X7F] (last visited Dec. 30,
2019).
79. Id.
80. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2019 TO 2029, at 7 tbl.1-1.
81. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE 2019 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 6 tbl.1-1 (2019),
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-06/55331-LTBO-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9J8-7ZL8].
82. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL
YEAR
2018,
at
6
(2019),
https://fiscal.treasury.gov/files/reports-statements/financialreport/2018/03282019-FR(Final).pdf [https://perma.cc/FJA3-V4G7] [hereinafter FINANCIAL REPORT
FOR 2018].
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unfunded liability of the Social Security system over the
seventy-five-year projection period was estimated to be $13.9 trillion
(0.9% of GDP or 2.61% of taxable payroll).83 Also, as of January 1,
2019, the unfunded liability of Medicare over the seventy-five-year
projection period was estimated to be $5.3 trillion (0.91% of taxable
payroll).84
As of September 30, 2018, the U.S. government’s civilian employee
pension plans were underfunded by $968.1 billion in fiscal year
2018,85 and its military pensions were underfunded by $767.9 billion
in fiscal year 2017.86 A number of U.S. federal government agencies
have also been identified as being at a “high risk” of generating
significant financial losses for the U.S. federal government.87 For
example, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, which insures the
pension benefits of around 37 million American workers and retirees
who participate in defined benefit pension plans, had a net
accumulated deficit of more than $51 billion for fiscal year 2018.88
Also, for fiscal year 2017, the U.S. federal government’s estimated
environmental liability was $465 billion.89
83. BD. OF TRS. OF THE FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS. TR. FUNDS, THE
2019 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS
INSURANCE
AND
FEDERAL
DISABILITY
INSURANCE
TRUST
FUNDS
15
(2019),
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/TR/2019/tr2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/77JQ-9YV8].
84. BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TR. FUNDS, 2019
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE AND FEDERAL
SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 67−69 (2019), https://www.cms.gov/ResearchStatistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/ReportsTrustFunds/Downloads/TR2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G67G-BDQA].
85. U.S. O FFICE OF PERS. MGMT., CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY FUND ANNUAL
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2018, at 25 tbl.1 (2019), https://www.opm.gov/aboutus/budget-performance/other-reports/fy-2018-csrdf-annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HE9N-MJCP].
86. OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., VALUATION OF THE MILITARY RETIREMENT
SYSTEM
AS
OF
SEPTEMBER
30,
2017,
at
24
tbl.6A
(2018),
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/26/2002122105/-1/-1/0/MRF%20VALRPT%202017%20[APRIL%
202019]%20FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/J8KQ-692S].
87. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-157SP, HIGH-RISK SERIES: SUBSTANTIAL
EFFORTS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE GREATER PROGRESS ON HIGH-RISK AREAS 25 (2019),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/697245.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GC4-5NF8].
88. Id. at 267; see also PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 2019, at 21 (2019),
https://www.pbgc.gov/sites/default/files/pbgc-fy-2019-annualreport.pdf?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery [https://perma.cc/7RPQ-8KK7].
89. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-157SP, HIGH-RISK SERIES: SUBSTANTIAL
EFFORTS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE GREATER PROGRESS ON HIGH-RISK AREAS 138.
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c. Measuring the Fiscal Gap
All in all, some form of generational accounting is needed to
measure the fiscal burdens facing present and future generations.90
One way to quantify a government’s long-term fiscal path is by
calculating the fiscal gap. The fiscal gap measures the difference
between government revenue and spending as a share of GDP over a
given period, and it can be calculated as a percentage of GDP or as a
present dollar amount.91 For example, the U.S. Treasury estimated the
U.S. government’s seventy-five-year fiscal gap at 4.1% for 2018, up
from 2.0% in 2017.92 In 2016, a Peter G. Peterson Foundation report
estimated that the seventy-five-year fiscal gap was anywhere from $30
trillion under current law to $103 trillion under current policy.93
Also, Boston University economist Laurence J. Kotlikoff has
calculated the fiscal gap over the infinite horizon at more than $200
trillion.94 The infinite-horizon fiscal gap equals the present value of all
projected future expenditures less the present value of all projected
future receipts.95 The infinite-horizon fiscal gap includes all spending
and receipts, however they are labeled, including so-called “off
budget” items. A positive fiscal gap shows that the government is
attempting to spend more than it can afford and thus is a “direct
measure of the unsustainability of . . . fiscal policy.”96 The fiscal gap
90. DANIEL SHAVIRO, TAXES, SPENDING, AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S MARCH TOWARD
BANKRUPTCY 221 (2007); Alan J. Auerbach, Jagadeesh Gokhale & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Generational
Accounting: A Meaningful Way to Evaluate Fiscal Policy, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1994, at 73, 75.
91. EY, ANALYZING THE US GOVERNMENT’S FISCAL GAP, at i (2016), https://www.pgpf.org/sites/
TAXES,
default/files/EY-Analyzing-Fiscal-Gap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A9Q2-DGZ3];
SHAVIRO,
SPENDING, AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S MARCH TOWARD BANKRUPTCY, supra note 90, at 218.
92. FINANCIAL REPORT FOR 2018, supra note 82, at 7, 10.
93. EY, supra note 91, at ii. Current law estimates are based on the Congressional Budget Office’s
extended baseline scenario, and current policy estimates are based on Congressional Budget Office’s
alternative fiscal scenario. Id. at iii.
94. LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, AMERICA’S FISCAL INSOLVENCY AND ITS GENERATIONAL
CONSEQUENCES
5
(2015),
https://kotlikoff.net/wpcontent/uploads/2019/04/AmericasFiscalInsolvency.pdf [https://perma.cc/LK9Q-4YQK]; Laurence J.
Kotlikoff & Nils Lehr, The 2019 US Fiscal Gap, KOTLIKOFF (Feb. 2, 2019), https://kotlikoff.net/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/The-2019-U.S.-Fiscal-Gap-Calculated-by-Laurence-Kotlikoff-and-NilsLehr.pdf [https://perma.cc/4N33-K7WT].
95. KOTLIKOFF, supra note 94, at 4−5.
96. Id. at 4.
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illustrates the fiscal burden that will be borne by future generations. It
also informs us about the size of the adjustment that would be needed
to close the gap and how the magnitude of the adjustment depends on
when that adjustment begins. However, Professor Shaviro disputes
whether the fiscal gap is the true issue for generational equity. In his
view, the real issue is “the overall distribution of lifetime consumption
between succeeding generations.”97 Intergenerational consumption
depends not only on fiscal policy but also on savings and the
productivity of investments, as well as on household decisions on
education, marriage, and child-rearing.
Table 1 shows Professor Kotlikoff’s comparison of his estimate of
the 2012 fiscal gap in the U.S. with his estimates of the fiscal gaps of
a number of European countries the same year.98 In that regard,
Kotlikoff suggested that there is little correspondence between
public-debt-to-GDP ratios and fiscal gaps.99 As an example, he noted
that in 2012 both the U.S. and the Netherlands had public-debt-to-GDP
ratios of roughly 70%, but he estimated that the true U.S. fiscal gap
was actually over twice that of the Netherlands.100

97.
98.
99.
100.

SHAVIRO, DO DEFICITS MATTER?, supra note 32, at 9.
KOTLIKOFF, supra note 94, at 8.
Id.
Id.
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Table 1: 2012 Fiscal Gaps in Major Developed Countries101
Country
U.S.
Germany
United Kingdom
Netherlands
France
Spain
Italy
Sweden

Fiscal Gap as a Share of the Present Value
of GDP
13.7
1.4
5.4
5.9
1.6
4.8
-2.3
1.7

2. State and Local Government Debt
As already mentioned, state and local governments in the U.S. are
typically required to balance their operating budgets.102 Consequently,
state and local governments tend to have relatively little in the way of
operating deficits, but they do have extensive bonded indebtedness in
connection with the building of schools, roads, and other projects. All
in all, state and local governments had almost $3.1 trillion in explicit
debt outstanding in 2017.103 That explicit debt should not be much of
a concern here, as the related collateral is often worth more than the
related debt, and much of that debt relates to investments that will
benefit both present and future generations.
State and local governments also have significant implicit debt. In
particular, many state and local governments offer traditional pensions
to their public employees, and these state and local government
pension plans have an aggregate unfunded liability of more than $4.5
trillion.104 Many state and local governments also provide their
101. Id.
102. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
103. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, supra note 76, at 3.
104. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FIRST QUARTER 2019 FEDERAL RESERVE
STATISTICAL RELEASE Z.1 FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 100 (2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20190606/z1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4D44-9G6L].
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employees with retiree health benefits and OPEBs, and the unfunded
liability associated with providing these benefits was estimated to be
$862 billion as of 2013.105 All in all, this roughly $5.4 trillion in
unfunded liabilities for state and local government pensions and
OPEBs is quite large compared to their 2017 explicit debt of $3.1
trillion and their 2017 total revenue of just $3.4 trillion.106
Aside from pension liabilities, it may be good for intergenerational
equity to borrow to fund infrastructure and long-lived assets. As noted
by the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities:
States and localities borrow to pay for infrastructure, rather
than use annual tax collections and other revenues, for sound
reasons. Public buildings, roads, and bridges are used for
decades but entail large upfront costs; borrowing enables the
state to spread out those costs. As a result, taxpayers who
will use the infrastructure in the future help pay for it, which
promotes intergenerational equity.107
In addition to those “sound reasons,” taxpayers and legislatures tend
to resist tax increases, even those that would fund schools; thus,
borrowing might offer a more realistic solution.108

105. ALICIA H. MUNNELL, JEAN-PIERRE AUBRY & CAROLINE V. CRAWFORD, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT
RES. B.C., HOW BIG A BURDEN ARE STATE AND LOCAL OPEB BENEFITS? 1 (2016), https://crr.bc.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/slp_48.pdf [https://perma.cc/327D-SP3K].
106. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, supra note 76, at 1.
107. CTR. FOR BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS—STATE AND LOCAL BORROWING 1–3
(2018),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/policybasics-sfpebt-1-15-15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A27X-FKGH].
108. See, e.g., Jeff Stein, In Blow to Liberal Efforts, Voters Across the Country Reject Tax Increases
(California
Is
the
Exception.),
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
7,
2018,
3:55
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/11/07/blow-liberal-efforts-voters-across-country-rejecttax-increases-california-proves-exception/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.473581d25875
[https://perma.cc/6WSZ-YTX2].
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Infrastructure

The U.S. is also falling behind in keeping up its infrastructure (e.g.,
roads and bridges, airports and rails, schools, and sewers).109
According to a recent report by the American Society of Civil
Engineers, the U.S. needs another $2.06 trillion to meet its cumulative
infrastructure needs.110 Adequate infrastructure is essential for future
prosperity. Improvements in infrastructure enable businesses to be
more productive in the long-term:
For example, a new bridge may greatly shorten commute
times and distances for truck drivers, allowing them to
deliver goods to consumers more quickly and at lower cost
to themselves, and allowing businesses to produce and
deliver more goods to consumers. These changes result in
productivity growth for the economy as a whole, which is
the most important determinant of long-term economic
growth.111
As in the case of the fiscal gap, delaying investment in infrastructure
increases future costs.112
4. The Carbon Budget
The U.S. and other countries also need to address climate change.
The global greenhouse gas (GHG) budget (often described as the
carbon budget) is the amount of GHG that can be emitted in order to
keep global temperatures within a specified range—usually limited to
an increase of two degrees Celsius.113 As of November 16, 2019, the
109. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, supra note 27.
110. Id. at 5.
111. JEFFREY M. STUPAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44896, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INFRASTRUCTURE
INVESTMENT 9 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44896.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X7U-FAAC].
112. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, supra note 27, at 4.
113. Infographic: The Carbon Budget, WORLD RESOURCES INST. (Mar. 2014),
https://www.wri.org/resources/data-visualizations/infographic-global-carbon-budget
[https://perma.cc/EXW5-8469].
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concentration of carbon dioxide in the global atmosphere measured
412 parts per million.114 Even though estimates for the remaining
carbon budget vary widely, scientists almost universally recognize the
problem of human-caused climate change.115
As with closing the fiscal gap and the infrastructure gap, the longer
we delay in curbing GHG emissions, the higher the cost of
mitigation.116 Scientists expect climate change to significantly reduce
economic growth in the U.S. and beyond.117 In that regard, a
comprehensive report issued by the National Climate Change Group
in 2018 noted that “[w]ithout substantial and sustained global
mitigation and regional adaptation efforts, climate change is expected
to cause growing losses to American infrastructure and property and
impede the rate of economic growth over this century.”118 Moreover,
annual economic losses in some sectors are projected to be in the
hundreds of billions of dollars by the end of the century.119
Carbon pricing can be a cost-effective way to ease the transition to
a low-carbon world.120 According to a recent report, fifty-seven carbon
pricing initiatives have already been implemented or are scheduled to
be implemented worldwide: twenty-eight emission trading systems in
regional, national, and subnational jurisdictions as well as twenty-nine
carbon taxes, primarily applied on a national level.121 Of note, carbon
pricing systems can be structured to provide government revenue,

114. See Facts: Carbon Dioxide, NASA: GLOB. CLIMATE CHANGE, https://climate.nasa.gov/vitalsigns/carbon-dioxide/ [https://perma.cc/JR6K-JDY3] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019) (measured at
mid-troposphere levels).
115. Zeke Hausfather, Analysis: How Much ‘Carbon Budget’ Is Left to Limit Global Warming to 1.5
C?, CARBONBRIEF (Apr. 9, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-how-much-carbonbudget-is-left-to-limit-global-warming-to-1-5c [https://perma.cc/2AUU-8UAH].
116. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE COST OF DELAYING
ACTION
TO
STEM
CLIMATE
CHANGE
4
(2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/the_cost_of_delaying_action_to_stem_cli
mate_change.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9DS-TH6Z].
117. Id. at 10.
118. NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 8.
119. Id. at 26.
120. World Bank Grp. [WBG], State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2019, at 1, 8 (June 6, 2019),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/31755 [https://perma.cc/L4YQ-224M].
121. Id. at 9.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss3/5

24

Forman and Mann: Borrowing from Millennials to Pay Boomers: Can Tax Policy Create

2020]

BORROWING FROM MILLENNIALS

823

whether by auctioning carbon emissions permits or by imposing
carbon taxes.122
III. How Taxes Influence the Level of Resources for Future
Generations
A. Taxes, Deficits, and Public Debt
As Part II above showed, the U.S. federal government is spending
far more than it is raising in revenue.123 In fact, if current laws
generally remain unchanged, the U.S. federal government’s deficit is
projected to grow from 4.2% of GDP in fiscal year 2019 to an average
of 7.9% of GDP in fiscal years 2040−2049, and the public debt will
grow from 78% of GDP in fiscal year 2019 to 144% in fiscal year
2049.124
To be sure, occasional deficits can make sense when government
spending is used to smooth out the effects of business cycles.125
Modest borrowing and deficits may also make sense when
governments want to spread the costs of long-term projects and
investments across generations. On the other hand, sustainable
intergenerational justice norms will be violated if government deficits
and debt impose burdens on future generations.126
We believe that sustainable intergenerational justice norms require
each generation of taxpayers to pay for the government programs that
benefit that generation. Similarly, we recognize that certain types of
government investment, while benefiting current generations, have a
significant impact on the prosperity of future generations. Some
believe that U.S. taxes should be raised (or spending cut) so that
122. Id. at 9.
123. FINANCIAL REPORT FOR 2018, supra note 82, at 10.
124. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE 2019 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 6 tbl.1-1 (2019). These
estimates were prepared prior to the recent enactment of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2020, Public Law No. 116-94, which added billions more to future deficits. See, e.g., The Decade in the
Federal Budget, COMMITTEE FOR RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET (Dec. 30, 2019),
http://www.crfb.org/blogs/decade-federal-budget [https://perma.cc/NP8N-HDMF] (noting that the
Further Consolidated Appropriations Act 2020 has a ten-year cost of $426 billion).
125. See, e.g., DRIESSEN, supra note 28.
126. Buchanan, supra note 10.

Published by Reading Room,

25

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [], Art. 5

824

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:3

deficits and the public debt do not grow out of control and burden
future generations. At the same time, however, we recognize that
spending now on investments that will benefit future generations can
be justifiably financed by current deficits and future taxes on those
future generations. For example, borrowing today in order to build a
school for today’s students can be justified as an investment that will
benefit those students. Borrowing to defeat a pandemic or to create a
sustainable energy system can also be justified. Moreover, there is a
significant school of thought that holds that in an environment where
rates exceed the cost of borrowing, deficits can be maintained
indefinitely without negative consequences.127
Pertinent here, the Congressional Budget Office recently estimated
that about 12% of federal government spending goes toward
investments that can be expected to contribute to the economy for
some years into the future ($492 billion in 2018; 2% of GDP).128 These
investments fall into three broad categories: physical capital (including
government buildings, transportation infrastructure, water and power
projects, and computers and software), research and development
(including basic research, applied research, and development of new
products and technology), and education and training (including early
childhood, elementary, secondary, and postsecondary education).129
The federal government accounts for its investment spending on a cash
basis—that is, it records its expenditures as they are made.130 This
method of accounting for investment spending is transparent, but it can
overestimate the costs of investments because the benefits associated
with those investments do not “arrive” until later periods.131 All in all,

127. See, e.g., Olivier Blanchard, Public Debt and Low Interest Rates, 109 AM. ECON. REV. 1197, 1198
(2019) (“[T]he signal sent by low rates is not only that debt may not have a substantial fiscal cost, but also
that it may have limited welfare costs.”).
128. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL INVESTMENT, 1962 TO 2018, at 1, 10 (2019),
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-06/55375-Federal_Investment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C4AY8FGU].
129. Id. at 3.
130. Id. at 4.
131. Id.
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some 60% of federal investments are for nondefense purposes and
40% are for defense.132
On the other hand, programs like Social Security and Medicare,
which benefit current generations, should be fully funded, and the
pensions and OPEBs of federal, state, and local government workers
should also be fully funded. With respect to Social Security, several
recent proposals have called for various combinations of tax increases
and benefit cuts to bring the program into actuarial balance over the
seventy-five-year projection period.133 For example, the Social
Security 2100 Act would ensure that the Social Security system would
remain solvent for the rest of the century.134 Similarly, we believe that
the U.S. federal government should also raise taxes (or cut benefits) to
bring Medicare’s finances into balance.
Moreover, federal, state, and local governments should generally
fully fund their pensions and OPEBs. For example, when it comes to
funding traditional pensions, we believe that each generation of
taxpayers should pay the full cost of the salaries and the pensions of
the public employees who work for that generation.135 Currently, state
and local government employers frequently fall behind in their pension
contributions and then make up the shortfall in installments over the

132. Id. at 7.
133. Office of the Chief Actuary’s Estimates of Proposals to Change Social Security, SOC. SECURITY
ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/oact/solvency/index.html [https://perma.cc/5UM8-5G39] (last visited July
17, 2019).
134. H.R. 860, 116th Cong. (2019) (introduced on Jan. 30, 2019 by Representative John B. Larson
[D-CT]); Memorandum from the Office of the Chief Actuary to Chairman John Larson, Senator Richard
Blumenthal,
and
Senator
Chris
Van
Hollen
8
(Jan.
30,
2019),
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/solvency/LarsonBlumenthalVanHollen_20190130.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6M7P-XVQH]. The bill would actually raise benefits for many elderly Americans, but
it would also raise payroll taxes—especially on those Americans who earn more than $400,000 a year. Id.
But see Sylvester J. Schieber, Alice in Wonderland . . . or Is It Plunderland? The Generational
Implications of Social Security Financing Policy and New Proposals to Expand Benefits, J. RETIREMENT,
Fall 2019, at 8 (criticizing the Social Security 2100 Act for shifting the costs of benefit increases to future
generations).
135. To be sure, we recognize that the services provided by today’s teachers and other public employees
can sometimes represent investments that might be “justifiably financed” by taxes on the future taxpayers
that benefit from those services. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE UNDERFUNDING OF STATE AND LOCAL
PENSION PLANS 9 (2011), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011-2012/reports/0504-pensions.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BNZ-4LH8].
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following ten, twenty, or even thirty years.136 Instead, each year state
and local government employers should contribute, on an
employee-by-employee basis, the amount actually needed to fully
cover the pension liability attributable to each employee’s salary.137
It might also make sense for the U.S. federal government to move
back to pay-as-you-go style budgeting rules that could make it more
difficult to enact new tax or spending legislation that increases budget
deficits.138 This view is supported by the Committee for a Responsible
Federal Budget, which recently sent a letter to Congress urging
compliance with pay-as-you-go rules. 139 Budget balancing, however,
is a complex issue because deficit spending may be necessary in the
short-term to provide benefits in the long-term.
B. Tax Systems and Economic Growth
Taxes can influence individual decisions about working, saving, and
consumption, and each of these decisions can influence the level of
resources that are available to future generations.140 More specifically,
tax policy can create sustainable economic growth through four
specific channels: labor supply, physical capital, human capital, and
technological innovation.141 For example, while high marginal tax
rates may discourage work and savings, subsidies for education can
encourage people to enhance their skills; and subsidies for research
may promote technological innovation.

136. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 104, at 100.
137. Jonathan Barry Forman & Michael J. Sabin, Full Funding of Traditional State and Local
Government Pensions: The Entry-Age-Service-Cost Method, 2019 N.Y.U. REV. OF EMP. BENEFITS &
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 11-1, 11-4.
138. ROBERT KEITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41157, THE STATUTORY PAY-AS-YOU-GO ACT OF
2010:
SUMMARY
AND
LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
14
(2010),
https://budget.house.gov/sites/democrats.budget.house.gov/files/documents/CRS-stat-paygo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G7CM-NUNN].
139. Maya MacGuineas, Letter to Congress to Abide by PAYGO, COMMITTEE FOR A RESPONSIBLE
FED. BUDGET (May 1, 2019), https://www.crfb.org/sites/default/files/PAYGO%20Letter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G83K-QE7E].
140. See, e.g., Gale & Samwick, supra note 36.
141. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-47-15, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TAX POLICY 23−26 (2015).
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1. Lower Rates and Broader Tax Bases
High marginal tax rates can create disincentives for taxpayers to
work or save, and those disincentives can distort taxpayer choices and
lead to an inefficient allocation of labor and capital resources.142
Accordingly, most economists favor broad tax bases to keep marginal
tax rates as low as possible.143
a. Lowering Marginal Tax Rates
The empirical evidence suggests that high marginal tax rates on
labor income can lead individuals to work fewer hours or to withdraw
from the workforce completely.144 To be sure, the adverse effects of
high marginal tax rates can vary greatly depending upon factors such
as age and family type. For example, research has found that
“secondary earners” in two-earner households are more responsive to
high marginal tax rates than “primary earners.”145
The Congressional Budget Office recently estimated that the
economy-wide marginal tax rate on labor income in the U.S. was 27%
in 2018—18% from individual income taxes and 9% from payroll
taxes.146 Of course, marginal tax rates vary greatly depending upon
income level and family type. For example, higher income individuals
tend to face higher marginal tax rates on their labor earnings than lower
income individuals. Also, marginal tax rates can vary greatly within
income classes. In particular, the marginal income tax rates on labor
income that low-income individuals and families face can vary

142. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-6-01, OVERVIEW OF PRESENT LAW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
RELATING TO MARGINAL TAX RATES AND THE PRESIDENT’S INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATE PROPOSALS
40–44 (2001).
143. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-47-15, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TAX POLICY 4.
144. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, MARGINAL FEDERAL TAX RATES ON LABOR INCOME: 1962 TO 2028, at 1
(2019), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-01/54911-MTRchartbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5V9HKZE].
145. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-6-01, OVERVIEW OF PRESENT LAW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
RELATING TO MARGINAL TAX RATES AND THE PRESIDENT’S INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATE PROPOSALS
41.
146. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, MARGINAL FEDERAL TAX RATES ON LABOR INCOME: 1962 TO 2028, at
1.
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dramatically because their earned income tax credits phase in and
out.147
Additionally, high marginal tax rates can distort individual
decision-making about saving and investment.148 Marginal tax rates on
capital income also vary rather dramatically depending on the nature
of the investment and the income tax level of the individual or
family.149 Investment income is generally subject to federal income tax
rates of up to 37% in 2020; however, capital gains and dividends are
generally taxed at a preferential tax rate of 0%, 15%, or 20%,
depending on the income tax rate that would be assessed on the same
amount of ordinary income.150 Also, there are various tax advantages
associated with investments in homes, state and local bonds, annuities,
and life insurance.151 Moreover, marginal tax rates can vary
dramatically depending on the form of the organization (e.g.,
partnerships versus taxable corporations), the source of financing (e.g.,
debt versus equity), and the nature of the underlying assets (e.g., real
estate versus machinery).152 To be sure, high marginal tax rates are not
necessarily inconsistent with economic growth: in the 1950s, the top
U.S. marginal tax rate was over 90%, and yet the real GDP growth rate
averaged 4.2%.153 Economic analysis shows no strong relationship
between high tax rates and overall economic growth.154
A more steeply progressive income tax structure with higher
marginal rates on wealthy taxpayers could reduce income inequality.
A report published by the Center for American Progress in 2012 found
147. 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2018); Elaine Maag, C. Eugene Steuerle, Ritadhi Chakravarti & Caleb
Quakenbush, How Marginal Tax Rates Affect Families at Various Levels of Poverty, 65 NAT’L TAX J.
759, 761 (2012).
148. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-47-15, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TAX POLICY 10−17.
149. Id.
150. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1(a), (h) (2018); Rev. Proc. 2019-44, 2019-47 I.R.B. 1093.
151. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 163(a), 121, 103, 72, and 101(a) (2018).
152. See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TAXING CAPITAL INCOME: EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX
RATES
UNDER
2014
LAW
AND
SELECTED
POLICY
OPTIONS
(2014),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/49817taxingcapitalincome0.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3VH-2CVL].
153. THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42729, TAXES AND THE ECONOMY: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE TOP TAX RATES SINCE 1945, at
9 (2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R42729.pdf [https://perma.cc/MRF5-RA6U].
154. Id.
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that the cumulative effect of federal income tax changes from 1979
through 2007 reduced progressivity, and that the federal tax code was
one-third less effective in reducing income inequality in 2007 than in
1979.155 The top individual marginal tax rate in 1979 was 70%,
applying to incomes over $215,400 for married joint filers.156 For
perspective, the Tax Foundation calculated that amount to be
equivalent to $681,192 in 2013.157 In January 2019, Representative
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez proposed a 70% tax rate on incomes over
$10 million.158 Billionaires like Microsoft founder Bill Gates objected
to the plan, arguing that while tax rates could be more progressive, the
proposals of “some politicians” are too extreme and would lead to tax
dodging.159 Economist William Gale, while supporting the idea of
increasing taxes on wealthy Americans, noted that unless tax loopholes
were closed at the same time, the proposal would create “massive tax
sheltering activity.”160 Another way of saying “close loopholes” is
“broaden the base,” which will be discussed next.
b. Broadening the Tax Bases
The U.S. federal government collects almost all of its revenue from
individual income taxes, payroll taxes, and (to a much lesser extent)
corporate income taxes;161 and state and local governments get most
155. Linden, supra note 4.
156. TAX FOUND., FEDERAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES HISTORY: NOMINAL DOLLARS, INCOME
YEARS
1913–2011
(2011),
https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/
fed_individual_rate_history_nominal&adjusted-20110909.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9P2-9U57].
157. TAX FOUND., FEDERAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES HISTORY: INFLATION ADJUSTED (REAL
2012 DOLLARS) USING AVERAGE ANNUAL CPI DURING TAX YEAR, INCOME YEARS 1913–2013,
https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/fed_individual_rate_history_adjusted.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UKD4-7YEP].
158. Glenn Kessler, Ocasio-Cortez’s 70-Percent Tax Rate: Not So Radical?, WASH. POST (Jan. 31,
2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/01/31/ocasio-cortezs-percent-tax-ratenot-so-radical/ [https://perma.cc/Q343-KCZX].
159. Nilay Patel, Bill Gates Says Tax Policies Like Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s Are ‘Missing the
Picture,’ VERGE (Feb. 12, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/12/18220756/bill-gatestax-rate-70-percent-marginal-modern-monetary-theory [https://perma.cc/9Q22-QEM6].
160. William G. Gale, Ocasio-Cortez’s Tax on the Super Rich Won’t Happen. Here’s a Better Way to
Do It, CNN BUS. (Jan. 22, 2019, 5:35 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/22/perspectives/alexandriaocasio-cortez-tax-plan-alternative/index.html [https://perma.cc/K8MG-5CAH].
161. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2019 TO 2029, at 91 tbl.4-1

Published by Reading Room,

31

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [], Art. 5

830

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:3

of their tax revenue from property taxes, income taxes, and sales
taxes.162 Exclusions, deductions, credits, and many other tax
expenditures shrink each of these tax bases.163 As a result, tax rates
must be higher on each taxable base to collect the revenues needed.
For example, in 2018, the U.S. had a GDP of $20.494 trillion, gross
domestic income of $20.542 trillion, and personal income of $16.125
trillion,164 but the individual income tax is imposed on just a fraction
of GDP.165 To illustrate, the U.S. imposed the individual income tax
on just $9.0 trillion of 2017 adjusted gross income less deductions (just
$11.2 trillion of 2017 total income).166 In that regard, each year the
U.S. federal government identifies more than $1 trillion of individual
income tax expenditures.167
The payroll tax base is also somewhat narrow. For example, in 2018,
taxable payroll for the U.S. payroll tax was $7.262 trillion, just 35% of
GDP that year (0.3542 = $7.262 trillion / $20.502 trillion);168 and in
2017, the ratio of taxable payroll to covered earnings was 83.2%.169
(2019).
162. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, G19-QTAX1, QUARTERLY SUMMARY OF STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
TAX
REVENUE
FOR
FIRST
QUARTER
2019,
at
2
(2019),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2019/econ/g19-qtax1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J3QW-93V4].
163. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 defines tax expenditures as
“revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws[,] which allow a special exclusion,
exemption, or deduction from gross income[,] or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax,
or a deferral of tax liability.” JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-55-19, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES
FOR
FISCAL
YEARS
2019–2023,
at
2
(2019),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5239 [https://perma.cc/E953-J9EK].
164. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BEA 19-29, GROSS DOMESTIC
PRODUCT, FIRST QUARTER 2019 (THIRD ESTIMATE) CORPORATE PROFITS, FIRST QUARTER 2019
(REVISED ESTIMATE) 9–10 tbl.3, 15 tbl.8 (2019), https://www.bea.gov/system/files/201906/gdp1q19_3rd_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/339J-E4XG] [hereinafter GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT &
CORPORATE PROFITS]. Gross domestic income is conceptually similar to GDP. Id. at 4.
165. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 1304 (REV. 09-2019), INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAX RETURNS: COMPLETE REPORT 2017 (2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1304.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H5KG-W83H].
166. Id. at 6 tbl.A.
167. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-55-19, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR
FISCAL YEARS 2019–2023, at 20–32 tbl.1.
168. BD. OF TRS. OF THE FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS. TR. FUNDS, supra
note 83, at 216 tbl.VI.G6.
169. Id. at 143; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR REDUCING THE DEFICIT: 2019 TO 2028,
at 255−57 (2018), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/54667 [https://perma.cc/8P33-HL5Z]. Covered
earnings are the sum of wages and self-employment earnings in employment covered by the payroll tax.
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Also, U.S. labor’s share of gross domestic income (GDI) was
estimated to be just 57% in 2017.170
State and local sales taxes are also quite limited in their scope. In
particular, they tend to reach only the sales of tangible goods, not
services. 171 In that regard, only forty-five states have sales taxes, and
the median state sales tax base reaches just 23% of personal income.172
All in all, however, personal consumption expenditures in 2018 totaled
$13.949 trillion.173
State and local property taxes and estate, gift, and inheritance taxes
are also quite limited: they are imposed on only a small fraction of U.S.
property and property transfers. In that regard, most state and local
property taxes are imposed only on tangible real property and not on
tangible personal property or intangibles, and there are numerous tax
expenditures associated with property tax systems.174 Pertinent here,
the net worth of U.S. households was almost $104 trillion at the end of
2018, but just over $29 trillion was in real estate.175 The U.S. does not

BD. OF TRS. OF THE FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS. TR. FUNDS, supra note 83,
at 141–42.
170. Didem Tüzemen, W. Blake Marsh & Thao Tran, Trends in the Labor Share Post-2000, FED. RES.
BANK
KAN.
CITY
(Dec.
7,
2018),
https://www.kansascityfed.org/en/publications/research/mb/articles/2018/trends-labor-share-post
[https://perma.cc/D7B2-8NJK]. That would make labor’s share around $11.7 trillion in 2018 ($11.717
trillion = 0.57 × $20.542 trillion GDI). GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT & CORPORATE PROFITS, supra note
164, at 9−10 tbl.3. Moreover, compensation paid to employees in 2018 was just $10.84 trillion, including
$8.821 trillion in wages and salaries. Id. at 14 tbl.7.
171. NICOLE KAEDING, TAX FOUND., NO. 563, SALES TAX BASE BROADENING: RIGHT-SIZING A STATE
SALES TAX (2017), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20171026101536/Tax-Foundation-FF563.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KJ2F-AFHJ].
172. Id. at 2−3.
173. GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT & CORPORATE PROFITS, supra note 164, at 9 tbl.3.
174. See, e.g., M. DAVID GELFAND, JOEL A. MINTZ & PETER W. SALSICH, JR., STATE AND LOCAL
TAXATION AND FINANCE IN A NUTSHELL 36–47 (2d ed. 2000); Katrina D. Connolly & Michael E. Bell,
Strengthening the Local Property Tax: The Need for a Property Tax Expenditure Budget 4 (Lincoln Inst.
of
Land
Policy,
Working
Paper
2011),
https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/2017_1341_connolly_wp11kc1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3K4D-M76P].
175. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 104, at 8 tbl.B.1; Households and
RES.
BANK
ST.
LOUIS,
Nonprofit
Organizations;
Net
Worth,
Level,
FED.
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TNWBSHNO [https://perma.cc/2H95-FA4G] (last visited Dec. 30,
2019).
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have a wealth tax,176 and the estate and gift taxes apply only to the very
wealthiest Americans.177
By broadening these tax bases, an increasing amount of economic
activity could be subjected to taxation and marginal tax rates could be
reduced. Accordingly, the economic distortion caused by high
marginal tax rates would be reduced, and that should lead to more
economic growth and more economic resources for future generations.
2. Choosing the Right Mix of Taxes for Economic Growth
a. Choosing Between Income and Consumption Taxes
Supporters of consumption taxes often argue that relative to income
taxes, consumption taxes would encourage investment and thus
promote economic growth.178 On the other hand, opponents of
consumption taxes note that, because a consumption tax base is
theoretically smaller than an income tax base, tax rates would have to
be higher under a consumption tax than under an income tax.179 While
personal income in the U.S. in 2018 was $17.6 trillion, personal
consumption expenditures that year totaled $13.9 trillion.180
Consequently, if the U.S. federal government wanted to raise the
roughly $4.1 trillion that it spent that year181 with a comprehensive
consumption tax, the average consumption tax rate would need to be
about 29.5% (0.2949 = $4.1 trillion / $13.9 trillion), compared with an
average comprehensive income tax rate of just 25.4% (0.2547 = $4.1
trillion / $16.1 trillion).
176. See EDWARD N. WOLFF, TOP HEAVY: THE INCREASING INEQUALITY OF WEALTH IN AMERICA
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 48 (1999); Dawn Johnsen & Walter Dellinger, The Constitutionality

of
a
National
Wealth
Tax,
93
IND.
L.J.
111,
111
(2018),
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=11279&context=ilj
[https://perma.cc/ZV3A-V782].
177. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-9-19, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AS IN EFFECT
FOR 2019, at 18–19 (2019).
178. JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK 147 (2006).
179. Id.
180. See GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT & CORPORATE PROFITS, supra note 164, at 15 tbl.8, 9 tbl.3.
181. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2019 TO 2029, at 150 tbl.F-1
(2019).
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The U.S. federal government does not have a broad-based
consumption tax. In that regard, however, if the federal government
adopted a 5% value-added tax, it could raise $2.970 trillion over ten
years.182 Of course, sales taxes and value-added taxes tend to be
regressive.183 That is, the burden falls more heavily on low-income
individuals than on higher income individuals (who tend to save a
greater portion of their incomes).184 One way to offset that regressivity
would be to provide rebates to low-income individuals.185
Another way to offset the regressivity of a consumption tax would
be to use the revenue generated to provide generous public benefits
and services. For example, Sweden is a country with relatively low
poverty rates, a low level of economic inequality, and much better
prospects for upward economic mobility than the U.S.186 Sweden does
not have particularly redistributive tax policies; instead, all Swedes
face a relatively high rate of tax, yet Sweden achieves greater equality
by providing generous public benefits and services to all
Swedes—paid for by those high taxes.187 The average individual in
Sweden faces a 42.9% tax burden, while corporations only pay an
average 19.8% tax, and although there is no estate tax, there is a robust
national sales tax.188
Yet another approach for reducing the regressivity inherent in taxing
consumption would be to adopt a progressive personal consumption
tax instead of a value-added tax or a broader sales tax.189 Under a
182. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR REDUCING THE DEFICIT: 2019 TO 2028, at 289 (2018).
183. See, e.g., ERIC TODER, JIM NUNNS & JOSEPH ROSENBERG, URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR.,
A
VAT
TO
REFORM
THE
INCOME
TAX
2
(2012),
USING
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/25031/412489-Using-a-VAT-to-Reform-theIncome-Tax.PDF [https://perma.cc/W8S5-N7AP].
184. Id. at 1.
185. Id. at 3.
186. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., GROWING UNEQUAL? INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND
POVERTY IN OECD COUNTRIES 25
fig.1.1, 127
fig.5.1, 205
fig.8.1
(2008),
http://www.oecd.org/document/53/0,3343,en_2649_33933_41460917_1_1_1_1,00.html
[https://perma.cc/N877-UYBE].
187. Monica Prasad, How to Think About Taxing and Spending Like a Swede, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/07/opinion/europe-taxes-sweden.html
[https://perma.cc/CFA3-NCE4].
188. Id.
189. See generally William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87
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personal consumption tax, each individual would add up all of her
wages, dividends, interest, gains, and other income; subtract her net
savings; and pay tax on the balance, with higher marginal tax rates
applying to those with higher balances.
b. Taxing Wealth
In passing, it is worth noting that a broad-based tax on wealth could
generate significant revenues with relatively little economic
distortion.190 However, some scholars have noted that wealth taxes
may face constitutional challenges.191
IV. How Taxes Influence the Mix of Resources for Future
Generations
A. Externalities
Taxes can also be used to correct for market failures in the
consumption or production of goods.192 An externality exists when the
price of a product does not reflect the total cost to society of production
and consumption. An externality is negative when these costs are
greater than the price the consumer pays.193 For example, if the price
of coal does not take into account the pollution costs that result from
burning that coal, we say there is a negative externality, and it can be
appropriate to impose a pollution tax on the sale of coal to help pay for

HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974); Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 1575 (1979).
190. See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2014); WOLFF, supra note 176;
Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Progressive Wealth Taxation, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY
1,
4
(2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/SaezZucman_conference-draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LTK-3778].
191. See Daniel Hemel & Rebecca Kysar, The Big Problem with Wealth Taxes: Proposals by Senators
Warren and Sanders May Not Pass Constitutional Muster. Then What?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/07/opinion/wealth-tax-constitution.html
[https://perma.cc/23XNDLHD]. But see Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Shaky Case Against Wealth Taxation, AM. PROSPECT (Aug. 28,
2019), https://prospect.org/economy/shaky-case-wealth-taxation/ [https://perma.cc/BF6T-9FTQ].
192. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-47-15, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TAX POLICY 4 (2015).
193. Id.
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the health and environmental costs associated with the burning of that
coal.
On the other hand, an externality is positive when the social benefits
from a certain activity exceed their private costs.194 For example, when
the benefit to society from educating an individual is greater than the
cost of her education, there is a positive externality, and it can be
appropriate to use subsidies to help her pay for her education. All in
all, as individuals largely ignore the social benefits (and costs) of their
individual consumption decisions, they may consume goods at levels
that are not socially optimal, and taxes and tax expenditure subsidies
are tools that can correct those suboptimal externalities. Such taxes and
subsidies can make the economy more efficient, lead to greater
economic growth, and change the mix of resources that are available
for future generations.195
1. Oil, Gas, and Coal Tax Expenditures
The U.S. federal tax system has a number of provisions that provide
favorable treatment for investments in oil, gas, and coal production
projects, including so-called expensing of intangible drilling costs,
percentage depletion, and accelerated amortization for geological and
geophysical expenses. 196 These are costly tax expenditures,197 and it
would make sense to curtail them. In that regard, the Congressional
Budget Office has often included repealing the expensing of intangible
drilling costs and percentage depletion among its options for reducing
the U.S. federal deficit,198 and President Barack Obama repeatedly

194. Id.
195. Id. at 4−5.
196. 26 U.S.C. §§ 263(c), 613, 167(h) (2018); see also JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-27-11,
DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT LAW AND SELECT PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 1
(2011),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3787
[https://perma.cc/B3849YHG].
197. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-55-19, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR
FISCAL YEARS 2019–2023, at 20−31, 32 tbl.1. (2019).
198. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR REDUCING THE DEFICIT: 2015 TO 2024, at 43
(2014),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/49638-BudgetOptions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K6QY-LWT6].
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called for repeal of these fossil fuel tax preferences.199 Also, in 2017,
a number of Democratic members of Congress cosponsored the “Keep
It in the Ground Act of 2017,” a bill noting that, to avoid global
warming in excess of two degrees Celsius, 80% of carbon from proven
fossil fuel reserves should be kept in the ground.200
2. Other Aspects of Energy Policy
Energy policy is always a major concern for government. Over the
years, Congress has enacted many laws related to energy production
(including oil and gas and renewables) and conservation. Energy tax
policy involves using taxes and tax expenditures to alter the allocation
or configuration of energy resources and their use.201 Of course,
decisions about energy tax policy in the U.S. are political decisions
that embody compromises between economic and political goals. With
respect to economic goals, the International Renewable Energy
Agency predicted in its 2017 report that by 2020, electricity from
renewable energy will be consistently cheaper than electricity from
most fossil fuels.202 In the short term, however, U.S. President Donald
Trump supports a pro-fossil-fuel political agenda.203
a. The Gas Tax
The U.S. government could increase the excise taxes on motor fuels
and index them for inflation,204 and even the conservative U.S.
199. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S
FISCAL YEAR 2017 REVENUE PROPOSALS 89−95 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/SL34-KDVG].
200. H.R. 2242, 115th Cong. (2017) (introduced on April 28, 2017 by Rep. Jared Huffman [D-CA]).
201. SALVATORE LAZZARI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33578, ENERGY TAX POLICY: HISTORY AND
CURRENT ISSUES 1 (2008), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33578.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GBL-VDP6].
202. INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, RENEWABLE POWER GENERATION COSTS IN 2017, at 3
(2018),
https://www.irena.org//media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2018/Jan/
IRENA_2017_Power_Costs_2018_summary.pdf?la=en&hash=6A74B8D3F7931DEF00AB88BD3B33
9CAE180D11C3 [https://perma.cc/433L-HNUR].
203. David Roberts, Donald Trump Is Handing the Federal Government over to Fossil Fuel Interests,
(June
14,
2017,
7:56
AM),
https://www.vox.com/energy-andVOX
environment/2017/6/13/15681498/trump-government-fossil-fuels [https://perma.cc/ES48-TVNX].
204. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR REDUCING THE DEFICIT: 2019 TO 2028, at 282−83 (2018).
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Chamber of Commerce now seems interested in raising these taxes, at
least to help pay for infrastructure improvements.205 Some U.S. states
are also considering mileage taxes in an effort to maintain budgets in
the face of increasing fuel efficiency and the advent of electric
vehicles.206 In a 2018 report, the White House Council of Economic
Advisers cited the State of Oregon’s pilot program for vehicle miles
traveled taxes as an innovative program that can increase efficiency
and raise revenues needed to pay for infrastructure improvements.207
b. A Carbon Tax
Alternatively, Congress could raise revenue and reduce emissions
of carbon dioxide (CO2) by establishing a carbon tax (on those
emissions directly or on fuels that release CO2 when they are burned,
such as coal, oil, and natural gas). According to the Congressional
Budget Office, a tax of $25 per metric ton on most energy-related
emissions of CO2 would raise $1.1 trillion over ten years.208
Taxing carbon would likely have a regressive effect, as low-income
individuals spend a greater portion of their income on energy-intensive
goods, such as home heating and transportation.209 However, the
regressivity of a carbon tax could be mitigated with rebates.210
Moreover, as already noted,211 experts predict that climate change will
205. John Wagner, U.S. Chamber of Commerce to Push Trump, Congress to Raise the Gas Tax to Fund
Infrastructure, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2018, 10:50 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/u-schamber-of-commerce-to-push-trump-congress-to-raise-the-gas-tax-to-fund-infrastructure/2018/01/16/
e11345f0-fac8-11e7-a46b-a3614530bd87_story.html?utm_term=.22802a32acdd
[https://perma.cc/KKB7-XKW7].
206. Mann, supra note 69, 640–42.
207. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 160 (2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/ERP_2018_Final-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z769-PURK].
208. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR REDUCING THE DEFICIT: 2019 TO 2028, at 292.
209. DONALD MARRON, ERIC TODER & LYDIA AUSTIN, TAX POLICY CTR., TAXING CARBON: WHAT,
WHY, AND HOW 15 (2015), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/taxing-carbon-what-why-andhow/full [https://perma.cc/G6SV-6TB9].
210. See, e.g., DONALD MARRON & ELAINE MAAG, TAX POLICY CTR., HOW TO DESIGN CARBON
DIVIDENDS
1–2
(2018),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication/156300/how_to_design_carbon_dividend
s.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XTB-DN8B].
211. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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have a major economic impact on future generations, so mitigating
climate change would be important for intergenerational justice.212
c. Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation
Federal tax laws could also be used to promote the use of renewable
energy from the Sun or wind.213 Existing tax incentives for generating
electricity from wind and solar energy are in the form of
non-refundable tax credits.214 The two most significant of these tax
credits are the investment tax credit (ITC) for solar energy and the
production tax credit (PTC) for wind energy.215 PTCs provide a tax
credit that is measured by unit of electricity generated by the qualifying
project over a period of years. ITCs provide a tax credit based on the
cost of building the qualifying project.216
In contrast to carbon taxes, tax credits for renewable energy are, for
a variety of reasons, an inefficient way of encouraging sustainable
energy use. Tax credits reduce the average cost of electricity,
increasing demand for electricity. Congress does not allow the “sale”
of tax credits, so to reap the benefits of non-refundable tax credits,
complex structures must be used to share the tax credits with so-called
tax equity investors. 217 The use of tax equity reduces the amount of the
incentive that flows directly to the renewable energy sector.218
212. See NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 8, at 25−26; Neil Irwin, Climate Change’s
Giant Impact on the Economy: 4 Key Issues, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/17/upshot/how-to-think-about-the-costs-of-climate-change.html
[https://perma.cc/8Y53-FJRM].
213. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, JCX-46-16, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS OF
ENERGY-RELATED
TAX
EXPENDITURES
27–31
(2016),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=download&id=4915&chk=4915&no_html=1
[https://perma.cc/9V96-9HS2]; Roberta F. Mann, Smart Incentives for the Smart Grid. 43 N.M. L. REV.
127, 136–41 (2013).
214. 26 U.S.C. §§ 45, 48 (2018).
215. ROBERTA F. MANN & TRACEY M. ROBERTS, TAX LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 49 (2018).
216. Id.
217. MARK P. KEIGHTLY, DONALD J. MARPLES & MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R45693, TAX EQUITY FINANCING: AN INTRODUCTION AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 7−9 (2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45693.pdf [https://perma.cc/LRX2-BC6H].
218. MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43453, THE RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY
PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT: IN BRIEF 10 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43453.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WV5G-CCT6].

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss3/5

40

Forman and Mann: Borrowing from Millennials to Pay Boomers: Can Tax Policy Create

2020]

BORROWING FROM MILLENNIALS

839

Inefficient incentives might be better than no action at all given the
urgency of climate change and its economic impact on future
generations, but carbon taxes would be a more effective policy
choice.219
Tax incentives for homeowners and businesses can also promote
energy conservation.220 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 created a small
individual income tax credit for 10% of the cost of qualified energy
improvements to existing homes.221 Designed as a temporary tax
credit, it was extended several times before expiring in 2017.222 The
credit was worth a maximum of $500 for all years combined, from
2006 to 2017. The qualifying energy improvements included efficient
windows, electric heat pumps, and insulation.223 From 2006 through
2013, manufacturers of qualifying energy-efficient appliances could
also claim tax credits.224 Residential energy use makes up about
one-fifth of total energy use in the U.S., so conserving energy in the
residential sector could significantly increase future sustainability.225
3. Subsidies for Education and Research
The private benefits of investments in education and research are
significant. For example, research has shown that college graduates
219. See SHI-LING HSU, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX: GETTING PAST OUR HANG-UPS TO EFFECTIVE
CLIMATE POLICY 25–115 (2011), for a comprehensive discussion of carbon taxes.
220. LYNN J. CUNNINGHAM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40913, RENEWABLE ENERGY AND ENERGY
EFFICIENCY
INCENTIVES:
A
SUMMARY
OF
FEDERAL
PROGRAMS
1
(2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40913.pdf [https://perma.cc/AL4T-Q8RR]; see also Roberta F. Mann &
Mona L. Hymel, Getting into the Act: Enticing the Consumer to Become “Green” Through Tax
Incentives, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10419, 10419 (2006).
221. 26 U.S.C. § 25C (2018).
222. MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK & MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42089,
RESIDENTIAL ENERGY
TAX CREDITS: OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS 16−19
(2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42089.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZAY-8AE9].
223. Id. at 14.
224. 26 U.S.C. § 45M (2018) (repealed Mar. 23, 2018).
225. CRANDALL-HOLLICK & SHERLOCK, supra note 222, at 1. Unfortunately, the current U.S.
President, Donald J. Trump, has not been supportive of energy conservation measures. At a campaign
rally in Michigan in December 2019, the President complained about energy-efficient dishwashers and
lightbulbs. Brittany Shammas, Trump Was Impeached. But Dishwashers that Go ‘Boom’ Are on His
POST
(Dec.
29,
2019,
10:51
AM),
Mind.,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/12/19/trump-was-impeached-dishwashers-that-goboom-are-his-mind/ [https://perma.cc/TJH6-T7D6].
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have significantly higher lifetime incomes than high school
graduates.226 But there are also societal benefits (i.e., positive
externalities). Because private actors largely ignore those societal
benefits, levels of investment in education and research are lower than
optimal. Accordingly, it can be appropriate for governments to
promote education and research.227
For example, with respect to education, while most subsidies for
education are made through appropriations, tax preferences can also
be used to encourage individuals to obtain more education. In
particular, the U.S. federal government could increase the tax benefits
available to individuals for tuition, fees, and books under the American
Opportunity Tax Credit.228 Pertinent here, the American Opportunity
Tax Credit was greatly expanded in 2015; unfortunately, however,
those changes primarily made the credit more valuable for
high-income taxpayers—for example, by doubling the dollar threshold
for the credit’s phase-out.229 As a result, the American Opportunity
Tax Credit is now more heavily used by higher income households
than ever before.230 As children of higher income households were
already more likely to attend college than those from low-income
households,231 the 2015 expansion probably did little to reduce

226. See, e.g., Christopher R. Tamborini, ChangHwan Kim & Arthur Sakamoto, Education and
Lifetime Earnings in the United States, 52 DEMOGRAPHY 1383, 1386 (2015),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4534330/ [https://perma.cc/TXY8-5WW3]; Education
and Lifetime, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN. (Nov. 2015), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/researchsummaries/education-earnings.html [https://perma.cc/NH7P-NUBT] (noting that men and women with
bachelor’s degrees earn hundreds of thousands of dollars more than high school graduates).
227. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-47-15, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TAX POLICY 18−26 (2015).
228. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 25A (2018).
229. Id. § 25A(d)(1), amended by the 2015 Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act
(Division Q of Pub. L. No. 114-113) (making the American Opportunity Tax Credit permanent and
effectively eliminating the Hope credit).
230. MARGOT CRANDALL-HOLLICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42561, THE AMERICAN OPPORTUNITY
TAX
CREDIT:
OVERVIEW,
ANALYSIS,
AND
POLICY
OPTIONS
12
fig.3
(2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42561.pdf [https://perma.cc/W46P-EH2Z].
231. See, e.g., THE PELL INST. & PENN AHEAD, INDICATORS OF HIGHER EDUCATION EQUITY IN THE
UNITED
STATES
7
(2019),
http://pellinstitute.org/downloads/publicationsIndicators_of_Higher_Education_Equity_in_the_US_2019_Historical_Trend_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8HKE-PFX6] (discussing who enrolls in postsecondary education).
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inequality, and many of the new tax benefits may have been wasted on
higher income students who would have attended college anyway.232
Instead, education tax incentives should be designed to provide
more help for low-income students. In particular, the American
Opportunity Tax Credit should be fully refundable. That change would
actually benefit more low-income students, and consequently, it would
help reduce income inequality.233
B. Taxes to Encourage and Discourage Certain Kinds of
Consumption
Just as taxes and subsidies can be used to correct market failures that
result in positive and negative externalities, so too can taxes be used to
shape individual consumption habits. In that regard, section IV.A
above already explained how tax policy can shape consumption
choices with energy, conservation, education, and research; but tax
incentives can also influence many other consumer choices, including
choices about home size and home ownership234—and even choices
about fertility.235
1. Home Ownership
For example, the current U.S. income tax has numerous subsidies
for home ownership. In particular, home mortgage interest is generally
deductible, and gains from the sale of a personal residence are often
excludable.236 Not surprisingly, houses in the U.S. have gotten bigger,
even as families have gotten smaller.237 For instance, the average
house built in 2017 had 2,631 square feet of floor area, up from just
232. Id.
233. Under present law, the credit is only 40% refundable. 26 U.S.C. § 25A(i)(5).
234. See, e.g., Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the
Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1388−89 (2000).
235. See, e.g., Mona L. Hymel, The Population Crisis: The Stork, the Plow, and the IRS, 77 N.C. L.
REV. 13, 48−67 (1998).
236. 26 U.S.C. §§ 163(a), 121 (2018); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-47-15, ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND TAX POLICY 13 (2015).
237. See, e.g., THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 83−120 (1899) (discussing
unnecessary, “conspicuous consumption”).
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1,660 square feet in 1973.238 On the other hand, the average household
had just 2.52 people in 2019, down from 3.01 people per household in
1973 and 3.33 in 1960.239 Tax incentives for home ownership have
been justified by arguments that homeowners are better citizens who
vote and maintain property values.240 However, subsidizing
homeownership through the tax system has resulted in racial wealth
disparities, exacerbating inequality.241 Indeed, taxpayer dollars spent
on subsidizing homeownership through tax expenditures are more than
double the amount appropriated for low-income housing programs.242
In particular, as the mortgage interest deduction is in the form of a
deduction (reducing taxable income), it is an upside-down subsidy,
providing a greater benefit to higher income taxpayers. For example,
a $10,000 mortgage interest deduction taken by a taxpayer in the 37%
tax bracket would reduce tax liability by $3,700, while the same
deduction taken by a taxpayer in the 22% tax bracket would only save
$2,200. It would be appropriate to curb the tax breaks for
homeownership and redirect American spending towards investments
that would lead to economic growth or to investments in sustainable
assets like energy-saving windows and furnaces, or both.

238. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 2017 CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW HOUSING 345 (2018),
https://www.census.gov/construction/chars/pdf/c25ann2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6ZX-2QWZ].
239. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE HH-6. AVERAGE POPULATION PER HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY: 1940
TO PRESENT (2019), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/families/households.html
[https://perma.cc/V7AC-X4MZ]; see also Adela Muresan, Who Lives the Largest? The Growth of Urban
American
Homes in
the Last 100
Years, PROPERTYSHARK (Sept. 8, 2016),
https://www.propertyshark.com/Real-Estate-Reports/2016/09/08/the-growth-of-urban-american-homesin-the-last-100-years/ [https://perma.cc/733B-595U] (scroll down to “Evolution of Average US Home
Size” figure and click “1910” to restart the interactive figure).
240. Mann, supra note 234, at 1354−55.
241. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Homeownership in Black and White: The Role of Tax Policy in
Increasing Housing Inequity, 49 U. MEM. L. REV. 205, 223−25 (2018).
242. Andrew Woo & Chris Salviati, Imbalance in Housing Aid: Mortgage Interest Deduction vs.
Section 8, APARTMENT LIST (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.apartmentlist.com/rentonomics/imbalancehousing-aid-mortgage-interest-deduction-vs-section-8/ [https://perma.cc/KN8F-FYRV] (noting that the
mortgage interest deduction cost the federal government $71 billion, and that was more than double the
$29.9 billion that was spent on Section 8 housing).
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2. Influencing Fertility and Population Size
Tax policy can also influence individual and family choices about
marriage, fertility, and family size. In particular, tax policy can reduce
(or increase) the cost of having and raising children.243 In that regard,
various provisions of U.S. tax law provide child-related benefits: the
dependent care credit, the credit for adoption expenses, the child tax
credit, the American Opportunity Tax Credit, and the earned income
tax credit.244 Pertinent here, until 2018, U.S. tax law also provided for
a personal exemption of up to $4,050 per dependent, but the Tax Cut
and Jobs Act of 2017 eliminated that exemption.245
CONCLUSION
This Article developed a concept of sustainable intergenerational
justice, and we used it as a lens for examining tax policy. In particular,
this Article explained (1) how government choices about the level of
taxation and spending can affect the well-being of future generations,
and (2) how government choices about the mix of taxes and tax
incentives can affect the resources that are available to future
generations. All in all, this Article showed some of the ways that
well-designed tax incentives could be used to promote sustainable
intergenerational justice.

243. KEVIN J. MUMFORD & PAUL THOMAS, FERTILITY RESPONSE TO THE TAX TREATMENT OF
CHILDREN
7
(2016),
https://editorialexpress.com/cgibin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=NTA2017&paper_id=253 [https://perma.cc/KBG9-Q8J2]; see
also Kingsley Davis, Population Policy: Will Current Programs Succeed?, 158 SCIENCE 730, 732 (1967)
(discussing “zero population growth”—i.e., a replacement fertility rate—where the average number of
children born per woman would hold the population constant).
244. 26 U.S.C. §§ 21, 23, 24, 25A, 32 (2018).
245. Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054.

Published by Reading Room,

45

